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Abstract 
I motivate and articulate a dispositional account of aversive 
racism. By conceptualizing and measuring attitudes in terms 
of their full distribution, rather than in terms of their mode or 
mean preference, my account of dispositional attitudes gives 
ambivalent attitudes (qua attitude) the ability to predict 
aggregate behavior. This account can be distinguished from 
other dispositional accounts of attitude by its ability to 
characterize ambivalent attitudes such as aversive racism at 
the attitudinal rather than the sub-attitudinal level and its 
deeper appreciation of the analogy between traits and 
attitudes. 
Keywords: implicit attitudes; implicit bias; dispositional 
attitudes; attitudes 
Introduction 
Aversive racism is characteristic of individuals who 
consciously endorse egalitarian ideals but harbor less 
favorable feelings towards the relevant racial group – 
feelings which may or may not “be admitted inwardly” 
(Kovel, 1988, pp. 54-5) and cause subtle patterns of 
discriminatory behavior against members of that group 
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). There are many reasons, both 
intellectual and practical, to make our account of what it is 
to have an attitude answerable to this phenomenon. Socially, 
aversive racism is thought to be partly responsible for 
persisting racial gaps on health, education, employment, and 
economic outcomes despite Americans’ increasing tendency 
over the last half-century to endorse ideals of equality 
(Bobo, 2001; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). Psychologically, 
the case of aversive racism against blacks serves as the 
archetypical case for measuring and explaining how explicit 
and implicit attitudes can come apart (Greenwald et al., 
2009). And, philosophically, norm-discordant conditions 
like aversive racism seem “to mandate such a radical 
reconceptualization of the relation between cognition and 
behavior that traditional notions like belief seem quaint and 
inadequate” (Gendler 2008b, p. 642). 
What characterization of “attitude” best accounts for the 
attitudes held by aversive racists? In progressive debates 
about how to draw our “periodic table of attitudes” 
(Gendler, 2008b, p. 560), philosophers have pursued two 
strategies. One strategy preserves some core notion of belief 
(as propositional, norm-sensitive, and consciously-
accessible) while adding a new, contrasting category – such 
as aliefs (Gendler, 2008a, 2008b), patchy endorsements 
(Levy, 2015), structured beliefs (Mandelbaum, 2015), or co-
activated representational contents (Holroyd, 2016) – to the 
taxonomy.1 Although these theorists disagree about how 
best to distinguish their newly posited attitude of art from 
beliefs, they adopt a common strategy for characterizing 
aversive racists: aversive racists hold egalitarian beliefs that 
are discordant with the new attitude type. An important 
advantage of this style of approach is that it allows us to 
explicate aversive racism in terms of scientifically informed 
but folk-ready categories.2 However, a recurring concern 
about this approach is skepticism about “whether the 
phenomena that we see are sufficient to motivate wheeling 
in the big gun of a new fundamental taxonomical category” 
for attitudes (Egan, 2011, pp. 67-8) rather than 
accommodating them with conceptual resources already at 
our disposal (Mandelbaum, 2013; Kwong, 2012). 
The second strategy for explicating aversive racism hews 
to a single attitude category. It adverts to the lower-level 
basis of the attitude – such as belief-fragments (Egan, 2008, 
2011), mental states/processes (Machery, 2016), and finer-
grained dispositions (Schwitzgebel, 2010, 2013) – to 
identify aversive racism as discordance among those sub-
attitudinal elements. An advantage of this view is that it 
sidesteps positing a new taxonomical category. However, it 
does so by silencing our ability to ascribe aversive racism at 
the attitudinal rather than sub-attitudinal level: attitudes are 
not ascribable to those with the fragmented (Egan, 2011), 
ambivalent (Machery, 2016), or in-between (Schwitzgebel, 
2002, 2010, 2013) dispositions of aversive racists. 
I will introduce an account of attitude that enjoys the 
advantages of and avoids the disadvantages of these 
taxonomical strategies. I will explain how we can describe 
aversive racism at the attitudinal (rather than the sub-
attitudinal) level while positing only one kind of attitude 
type. However, rather than cast aversive racism into a 
traditional mold (Kwong, 2012), my solution looks forward 
by leveraging innovative methods for measuring 
psychological constructs to better characterize aversive 
racism and other norm-discordant attitudes. 
                                                            
1 Unlike Gendler, Mandelbaum and Levy believe that implicit 
attitudes are, like explicit beliefs, propositional and norm-sensitive. 
Despite this, they do not take implicit attitudes to “belong to the 
same natural kind” as beliefs (Mandelbaum, 2015, p. 636) or to be 
sufficiently sensitive to other mental representations “to properly 
be considered beliefs” (Levy 2015, p. 800). 
2 Social psychologists have preferred to explain aversive racism 
by adding a new type of attitude, namely implicit attitudes (for a 
dissenting view, see Fazio, 2007). This allows them to describe 
aversive racists as those who simultaneously hold egalitarian 
explicit attitudes and racist implicit attitudes towards the same 
social group (Son Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002). 
The particular view I will introduce adopts a dispositional 
account of attitude. Like other dispositional accounts 
proposed by philosophers (Machery, 2016; Schwitzgebel, 
2010, 2013), I will explicate my view by drawing an 
analogy between attitudes and personality traits. However, I 
will deepen this analogy in a way that reflects, not just how 
the structure of traits and attitudes mirror each other, but 
how meta-theoretical debates about and methods for 
characterizing traits and attitudes should mirror each other. 
Moreover, unlike other dispositional accounts – which deny 
the very possibility of attributing ambivalent attitudes 
(Machery, 2016, p. 124; Schwitzgebel, 2010, p. 544) – this 
view has the capacity to describe the contradictory 
tendencies of ambivalent attitudes such as aversive racism 
qua attitude. 
Dispositional Accounts of Attitudes 
According to a dispositional approach to conceptualizing 
attitudes, attitudes are tendencies to cognize and behave 
towards an object (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Krosnick, 
Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2005; Eagly & Chaiken, 2007; 
Greenwald & Nosek, 2008). Dispositions are kept 
conceptually separate from and remain agnostic about 
claims about the representations and processes underwriting 
them (Fazio, 2007; Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van 
Heerden, 2004). Dispositional constructs posited in 
psychology include personality traits such as the Big Five 
(openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and 
neuroticism).3  
The Analogy between Traits and Attitudes 
Personality traits and attitudes – when conceived as 
dispositional constructs – have a number of structural 
features in common. Philosophers who advocate for a 
dispositional approach to attitudes have leveraged some of 
these commonalities to explicate their views in illuminating 
ways (Schwitzgebel, 2002, 2013; Machery, 2016). What 
these views have in common with each other and with the 
dispositional approach adopted by social psychologists 
(Krosnick, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2005; Eagly & Chaiken, 
2007; Greenwald & Nosek, 2008) are the following basic 
ideas. Traits/attitudes are broad track dispositions to cognize 
and behave in certain ways. These dispositions are modal 
generalizations (concerning not just how people do in fact 
cognize and behave but how they would tend to across some 
relevant range of conditions). These 
dispositions/generalizations hold ceteris paribus. Individuals 
can be said to have more or less of a trait/attitude or not, 
where individual differences in the degree to which 
someone has a trait/attitude can be used to describe and 
predict behavior and cognition. Asking individuals to self-
report their own trait/attitude is just one of many methods 
                                                            
3 Constructs are simply theoretical posits that figure in 
psychological generalizations and explanations (Shadish Jr., Cook, 
& Campbell, 2002). For a classic discussion on the validation of 
dispositional constructs, see Campbell and Fiske (1959). 
for measuring the presence/degree of the dispositional 
construct of interest. Individuals can sincerely but falsely 
report the presence/degree to which they hold a trait/attitude 
as in cases of self-ignorance and self-deception; and, self 
reports can vary by context (Breckler & Wiggins, 1989). 
More generally, “manifestations of attitudes, as assessed by 
any measurement procedure” are “manifested imperfectly 
both by our measurement procedures and by other 
observable behaviors that it in part motivates” (Krosnick, 
Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2005, p. 23). As such, any method 
used to measure traits/attitudes are understood to be 
imperfect. 
How are attitudes, understood as dispositional constructs, 
related to the mental states and processes posited by mental 
state theorists who prefer to posit cognitive theories of 
attitude? In my view, the way to answer this question is to, 
again, think analogically to the study of personality traits. 
Like the attitudes literature, the personality trait literature 
underwent meta-theoretical, conceptual, and methodological 
debates about whether to characterize their psychological 
posit of interest at the level of dispositional construct or 
representation/process (Fazio, 2007; Mischel & Shoda, 
1998). In what I’ll call the “standard approach” to solving 
this dilemma, personality theorists characterize traits as 
dispositions that are underwritten by representations and 
processes that serve as the psychological basis for those 
dispositions (Epstein, 1994). Likewise, social psychologists 
(Greenwald & Nosek, 2008; Eagly & Chaiken, 2007) and 
some philosophers (Machery, 2016) who advocate for a 
dispositional approach to characterizing attitudes suggest 
that attitudes are dispositions that are underwritten by 
representations and processes – representations and 
processes that mental state theorists aim to uncover. 
Sub-Attitudinal Accounts of Aversive Racism 
Social psychologists who posit two types of dispositional 
attitude (one implicit and one explicit) can characterize 
aversive racism as a conflict at the attitudinal level: e.g., 
between positive explicit attitudes versus racist implicit 
attitudes towards the same group). However, philosophers 
who posit dispositional accounts of attitude have been 
taxonomically more conservative, preferring to posit one 
rather than two attitude types. In what follows, I will explain 
why, according to these philosophical views, aversive 
racism is describable only at the sub-attitudinal rather than 
the attitudinal level. I will then explicate my own view, 
which draws on new methods for characterizing personality 
traits, describes aversive racism at the attitudinal level, and, 
in so doing, articulates my solution to the taxonomical 
puzzle. 
Aversive Racism as an In-Between Attitude 
The heart of Eric Schwitzgebel’s dispositional account is the 
idea that “[t]o have an attitude is, primarily, to have a 
dispositional profile that matches, to an appropriate degree 
and in appropriate respects, a stereotype for that attitude, 
typically grounded in folk psychology” (Schwitzgebel, 
2013, p. 78). Each dispositional, folk-psychological 
stereotype can be broken down into sub-attitudinal 
dispositions, including behavioral, cognitive, and 
phenomenal dispositions (Schwitzgebel, 2002). For 
example, being extraverted is just to have further 
stereotypical dispositional tendencies like enjoying meeting 
new people, enjoying parties, “to be talkative, and to take 
the lead in social situations” (Schwitzgebel, 2013, p. 81). 
Likewise, regarding one’s colleagues as a talented group is 
to be disposed to feel proud to be among them, be 
unsurprised when they win awards, and seek them out for 
insight, among other things (Schwitzgebel, 2013). 
Schwitzgebel rightly observes that “[f]ew of us are 100% 
extravert or 100% introvert, 100% high-strung or 100% 
mellow” – that we tend to match such stereotypical 
dispositions imperfectly (Schwitzgebel, 2013). 
Analogously, he observes that we can fail to match 
stereotypical attitude dispositions imperfectly 
(Schwitzgebel, 2013). In imperfect cases, Schwitzgebel 
suggests that “[r]oughly speaking, the greater the 
proportion of stereotypical dispostions a person possesses, 
and the more central these are to the stereotype, the more 
appropriate it is to describe him as having the belief in 
question” (Schwitzgebel, 2001, p. 81, italics mine): 
methodologically, the injunction is to attribute an attitude 
when a subject has the majority of the stereotypical sub-
attitudinal dispositions or just the central ones, whatever 
those turn out to be for that particular context. 
How does Schwitzgebel’s account of attitude describe 
aversive racism? On his view, aversive racism can’t be 
characterized as a contradictory attitude since contradictory 
attitudes are “in general impossible” (Schwitzgebel, 2010, p. 
544): we can’t describe a subject as simultaneously having 
the majority/central stereotypical sub-attitudinal dispositions 
for and against p. Instead, Schwitzgebel suggests that we 
treat aversive racism as an in-between attitude 
(Schwitzgebel, 2010, 2013).4 For in-between attitudes, “it’s 
not quite right, as a general matter, either to ascribe or to 
deny” attitudes/traits “simpliciter” (Schwitzgebel, 2010, pp. 
535-7). Instead of trying to describe such cases at the 
attitudinal level, he suggests that we move instead to “more 
complicated appeals to specific dispositions or sets of 
dispositions” (Schwitzgebel, 2002, p. 266): in the case of 
aversive racism, we should describe individuals in terms of 
sub-attitudinal behavioral, phenomenal, and cognitive 
dispositions (e.g., the tendency to report holding egalitarian 
views while also tending to differentially attribute 
“brilliance” to white rather than black students). 
Accordingly, Schwitzgebel’s view accounts for and describe 
aversive racism at the sub-attitudinal rather than the 
attitudinal level.5 
                                                            
4 Although Schwitzgebel originally characterized his analysis of 
in-between cases as cases of in-between belief (Schwitzgebel, 
2001), he has since extended the generality of his account to cover 
cases of in-between attitude as well (Schwitzgebel, 2013). 
5 In passing, Schwitzgebel suggests that an attitude like aversive 
racism could be ascribable at the attitudinal level as soon as the 
Aversive Racism as an Ambivalent Attitude 
On Edouard Machery’s view, to have an attitude is to have a 
broad-track disposition “to behave and cognize (have 
thoughts, attend, emote, etc.) toward an object (its formal 
object) in a way that reflects some preference” (Machery, 
2016, p. 112). Machery takes what I call the standard 
approach for solving meta-theoretical questions about how 
dispositional constructs and mental states/processes relate to 
one another: he suggests that attitudes (qua dispositions) are 
underwritten by mental states and processes which serve as 
the psychological basis of the attitude. For example, the 
degree to which a person can be described as courageous 
depends on mental states and processes – including “her 
moral beliefs (e.g., whether fear is shameful), on the nature 
of her fear reactions, on the strength of her pride, on her 
capacity for self-control, etc.” (Machery, 2016, p. 112). 
Likewise, the degree to which someone can be characterized 
as being racist depends on mental states and processes – 
including “moral beliefs (e.g., for most of us the belief that 
racism is wrong or, for some racists, the belief that racism is 
right), on non-propositional associations between concepts 
(e.g., an association between the concept of a black man and 
the concept of danger), on emotions (e.g., fear when 
confronted with black men), and on a weak self-control” 
(Machery, 2016, p. 112). 
How does Machery deal with the problem of aversive 
racism? Aversive racism is a kind of ambivalent attitude, 
characterized by cognition and behavior that reflects both 
favorable and unfavorable evaluations of the relevant 
racial/ethnic group. However, this account denies the 
possibility of ambivalent attitudes “except perhaps in 
pathological cases” (Machery, 2016, p. 124). To better 
motivate and contextualize why Machery might hold this 
view, I’ll expand the working analogy between the attitudes 
and traits literatures to talk at the methodological level. As I 
mentioned before, in personality psychology, the standard 
approach conceptualizes traits as dispositional constructs 
underwritten by the mental states/processes that form their 
psychological basis. Early on, personality theorists 
characterized these dispositions as central tendencies – 
operationalized as a person’s mean or average tendency to 
cognize/behave – so as to describe that person as an 
individual and to describe how she differs from others. 
When conceptualized in this way, a dispositional construct 
is more useful and informative the more closely that 
person’s cognitions and behaviors track some average 
tendency: it would not be very useful to describe an 
individual as “extraverted on average” if she fluctuated 
                                                                                                    
relevant folk stereotype has been established (Schwitzgebel, 2013, 
pp. 94-5). So long as our folk psychological repertoire has not been 
so changed, Schwitzgebel’s view does not account for and describe 
aversive racism at the attitudinal level. Even if/when our folk 
psychological concepts make such a shift, I think there are good 
reasons to prefer my dispositional view, which adopts a more 
standard psychological approach for characterizing what lies at the 
sub-attitudinal level and grounds attitude dispositions in 
scientifically more satisfying ways. 
wildly between extraversion and introversion on different 
occasions (Fleeson, 2004, pp. 83-4). 
I think this is why Machery says of ambivalent attitudes 
that “[i]f the hypothesized co-referential, differently 
valenced mental states” lead people to “act and cognize in a 
way that expresses a positive preference in some contexts” 
and “a negative preference in other contexts,” then “their 
aggregate behavior cannot be predicted (even imperfectly) 
by postulating a trait” (Machery, 2016, p. 124, italics mine). 
The more that aversive racist cognitions and actions vary, 
the less traction we have, conceptually and 
methodologically, to attribute attitudes to them. Machery is 
not alone in adopting this method of means: social 
psychologists who advocate for the existence of one type of 
attitude disposition also advert to an individual’s mean 
preference for an object when measuring the strength and 
direction of their attitude about that object (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 2007).6 
Sub-attitudinal versus attitudinal accounts 
As we have seen, competing dispositional accounts of 
attitude can describe aversive racism, but do so by adverting 
to sub-attitudinal elements rather than appeal to an attitude 
proper.  
Pace these accounts, I will explain how it is conceptually 
possible for dispositional accounts to characterize 
ambivalent attitudes such as aversive racism. By 
conceptualizing aversive racism as an attitude, we provide a 
perspicuous way to speak about how individuals belonging 
to that category will cognize/behave in the future, how they 
are similar to each other, and how they differ from those 
who hold different attitudes towards the same racial/ethnic 
group. 
A New Dispositional Account 
I think that we can address limitations to Machery’s view by 
drawing from advances in psychology. Like Machery, I will 
adopt the “standard view” for resolving the dispositional 
construct versus mental state/process debate. However, I 
will advocate for a finer-grained method for characterizing 
dispositional attitudes.7 
                                                            
6 Some social psychologists who advocate for mental state views 
also take the means approach, whereby “attitudes are defined as 
summary evaluations” (Fazio, 2007, p. 608, italics mine). 
7 Because of hard limits on space, I will not be able to provide 
an argument for dispositional accounts of attitude over mental state 
accounts here. Schwitzgebel favors his dispositional account over 
more traditional mental state approaches because his view, unlike 
all-or-nothing mental state approaches, could characterize in-
between atttiudes at the sub-attitudinal level (Schwitzgebel, 2002, 
2001, 2010). However, mental state theorists have since adopted 
more complex views to accommodate in-between cases (Gendler 
2008b; Mandelbaum, 2015; Levy, 2015). Machery uses an 
inference to best explanation to argue for a dispositional approach 
over a mental state approach (Machery, 2016). However, he and I 
disagree about what inferences should be drawn from the mixed 
psychometric evidence (Lee, forthcoming). I think that there are 
other reasons for preferring a dispositional account, including its 
To get us started with the basic idea, let’s consider a 
stylized example from the domain of moods. Let’s imagine 
we are trying to characterize the emotional lives of two 
individuals. We ask them to report their mood along a single 
scale that ranges from the negative range (sad) to the 
positive (happy) many times over a multi-week period. 
Imagine that the two individuals turn out to have the same 
mean/average mood (which lies mid-way on our scale). 
However, one individual is almost always in a neutral 
emotional state while the other rapidly cycles between being 
extremely happy and extremely sad in equal amounts. If we 
were to characterize their emotional lives simply in terms of 
their mean mood, we would lose crucial information that 
could be used to capture what distinguishes these distinctive 
individuals. 
This is what happens when we characterize dispositions in 
terms of mean scores while overlooking information about 
their full distribution of scores. When we discard 
information about the distribution of scores, we forgo 
characterizing and drawing distinctions between finer-
grained psychological categories. My proposal is to amend 
the method of means by characterizing dispositions not 
simply in terms of their mean tendency but also in terms of 
their distribution. 
William Fleeson proposed and fruitfully applied this 
methodological injunction to the study of personality traits: 
personality traits should be distinguished not simply by their 
means, but also by distributions over time and contexts: 
personalities should be said to differ not simply when their 
means differ but when their distributions differ (Fleeson, 
2001). Characterizing traits in terms of means and 
distributions allows personality psychologists to 
accommodate within-person variability while still 
characterizing traits as stable distributions, so long as an 
individual’s mean and distribution are stable attributes of 
that individual. Here, variability in cognition and behavior is 
its own kind of stable individual-differences characteristic 
(Fiske, 1961; Larsen, 1989; Murray, 1938). So, if an 
individual veers wildly between low and high extraversion, 
but that fluctuation is a stable property of that individual 
across a suitably large range of times and contexts, we can 
characterize and distinguish her as a different kind of 
extravert than the consistently moderate extravert who has 
the same mean extraversion score. 
I propose that we carry over this methodological 
injunction to the case of attitudes. Conceptualizing attitudes 
in terms of an individual’s mean and distribution of 
reflected likings and dislikings gives us an intuitive and 
powerful way of characterizing attitudes – especially, 
ambivalent attitudes. To see this, let’s consider another 
stylized example: how should we characterize the aversive 
racist versus an individual who holds relatively neutral 
views about the relevant racial/ethnic group?8 Here, the 
                                                                                                    
epistemic modesty, which can have pragmatic benefits from a 
stakeholder/institutional perspective (Lee, forthcoming). 
8 In making this comparison, I adopt the working assumption in 
psychology that neutral attitudes can be distinguished from 
neutral individual demonstrates a more consistent 
indifference, reflecting neither a liking not a disliking for 
the racial/ethnic group in their cognition and behavior, 
including results from direct tests for explicit attitudes and 
indirect tests for implicit attitudes. In contrast, the aversive 
racist’s preferences fluctuate between a strong liking and a 
strong disliking of the racial/ethnic group on direct and 
indirect tests. My approach allows us to distinguish the 
attitudes held by the aversive racist and the neutral 
individual in terms of differences in the distributions of their 
reflected preferences. 
By conceptualizing and measuring attitudes in terms of 
their full distributions – rather than rely solely on their mode 
or means as Schwitzgebel and Machery do – my account of 
dispositional attitudes makes it possible for ambivalent 
attitudes qua attitude to predict aggregate behavior. Here, 
ambivalent attitudes can describe and predict trends in 
cognition/behavior so long as there is stability in an 
individual’s distribution of reflected preferences across a 
suitably large range of times and contexts. (Ambivalent 
attitudes do not describe and predict cognition/behavior 
strongly enough to predict individual events – there is too 
much intra-individual variation for that.) By bestowing 
descriptive and predictive power to ambivalent attitudes qua 
attitude, my account can thereby describe and ascribe 
aversive racism at the attitudinal level, and do so while 
positing only one attitude type. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have motivated and articulated a 
dispositional account of aversive racism. My account can be 
distinguished from other dispositional accounts by its ability 
to characterize aversive racism at the attitudinal level and its 
deeper appreciation of the analogy between traits and 
attitudes. 
To evaluate the feasibility and fruitfulness of this account, 
future research will need to address further questions about 
how to implement this proposed account. First, how are 
different attitudes towards an object – characterized by 
means and by distributions – distinguished from each other? 
For example, on what grounds would we distinguish a 
category of strong racist from a weak racist from a neutral 
individual, especially if there is intra-individual variability 
in scores for each category? Second, how should available 
direct and indirect measures/tests for attitudes be 
selected/combined to provide an appropriate sample (and 
scaling) of attitude scores for characterizing an attitude 
                                                                                                    
ambivalent attitudes by their relative indifference to the object and 
the stability of that indifference across contexts (Kaplan, 1972; 
Bell, Esses, & Maio, 1996; Jonas, Broember, & Diehl, 2000). As 
such, neutral and ambivalent attitudes have different functional 
characteristics. For example, ambivalent attitudes can be socially 
flexible in ways that neutral attitudes are not, where “the co-
existence of positive and negative components allows people to 
express their position by putting forward the component that best 
fit the specific normative context” without being forced to change 
their “general attitude” (Cavazza & Butera, 2008, p. 2). 
toward an object?9 These questions should be explored 
psychometrically, though such evidence may not point to 
unique solutions, since some approaches may be more 
suitable for some purposes than others. 
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